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Abstract
Background: Informal payments for health care services can impose financial hardship on households. Many
studies have found that the position within the household can influence the decision on how much is spent on
each household member. This study analyses the intra-household differences in spending on informal payments
for health care services by comparing the resources allocated between household heads, spouses and children.
Methods: Pooled data from two cross sectional surveys, the Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey 2002
and 2005, are used to analyse both the probability and the amount paid in inpatient and outpatient health care
services. A generalised Hausman specification test is used to compare the coefficients of probit and OLS models
for nuclear and extended households.
Results: We find that due to the widespread informal payments there are no significant differences between
households in the incidence of informal payments for households’ members, but there are more differences in the
amount paid informally. Results suggest that households strategically allocate their resources on health care by
favouring individuals with higher earning potential who have invested more in human capital. Extended
households pay higher amounts for spouses with higher education compared to nuclear households. On the other
hand, nuclear households choose to pay higher amounts for children with a higher level of education compared
to extended households.
Conclusions: The differences between households should be taken into account by public policies which should
compensate this by redistribution mechanisms targeting disadvantaged groups. Governments should implement
effective measures to deal with informal patient payments.
JEL Codes: I10, I19, D10
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Background
Health care expenditures are idiosyncratic risks imposed
on households that can cause financial hardship, espe-
cially if the costs are uninsured. In many Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries and the Former
Soviet Union (FSU) informal payments for health care
are reported to be high and since they are informal,
they are not covered by any formal insurance mechan-
ism. The available strategies to cope with such risks can
vary from digging into savings, selling assets, increasing
labour supply, or reallocating resources within the
household [1-3]. The position within the household and
the number of household members may influence the
decision on how much is spent on informal health care
payments. Nuclear and wealthy households are believed
to be better able to protect their children against higher
expenditures associated with health care use than
extended households. On the other hand, the amount
allocated to adult household members may depend on
their contribution to household income but also on the
type of household [4].
This article looks at how different types of households
respond to informal payments to medical staff when
multiple household members use health care. We ana-
lyse the effect characteristics of household heads,
spouses and children have on the probability or the
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between these members of households. For this purpose,
we use data from the Albanian Living Standards Mea-
surement Survey 2002 and 2005. The article contributes
to the existing literature on intra-household allocation
of resources by providing insights on how households
cope with unregulated payments in health care when
the government policies fail and little is known about
the actual prices.
The literature on informal payments has concentrated
on the main causes and consequences of such payments
[1,5-11]. Little is known on the impact that the deci-
sion-making within the household has on the amounts
paid for different members of the household. The theory
of social risk management [12] predicts that when gov-
ernments fail to provide protection, the family and
social network may help in coping with particular
shocks. In the case of informal payments in health care,
household members may support each other by redir-
ecting financial assets or being involved in direct care
during the hospitalisation periods.
In countries like Albania, where many households
have preserved their patriarchal structure and gender
inequalities are prevalent [13], it is important to see if
decision making on health expenditure depends on the
severity of illness or on the position that the patient has
in the household. Such information is relevant not only
to understand the dynamics of intra-household alloca-
tion of resources but also to guide policies that aim at
redistributing income between household members.
This can help to increase the effectiveness of programs
like social cash transfers or health care subsidies to
reach out to more household members (e.g. children or
spouses).
Informal patient payments in Albania
The high incidence of informal payments in most CEE
and FSU countries is frequently attributed to the simila-
rities in health care systems and the common difficulties
in the transition from planned to market economies
[11]. The ideology adopted by the communist regimes
emphasised universal access to health care but did not
focus on improving efficiency and quality of such ser-
vices [14]. The fall of communism brought new chal-
lenges for these health care systems. The high number
of hospital beds, overstaffed health facilities, underpaid
health care professionals, and the reduction of the
investments provided the conditions for informal pay-
ments [1,2,5].
The health sector in Albania has followed the same
trends as other ex-communist countries where the
health sector was underfinanced and considered a non-
productive sector [15]. After the 1990s the public health
care system is characterised by a low level of
investments, a limited number of physicians (mainly
concentrated in the big cities and the capital of the
country), low quality of services, unqualified staff,
unmotivated medical personnel, and frequent lack of
medicines in public hospitals [15-17]. According to the
Ministry of Health [18], in 2003 Albania spent around
5.9 per cent of its GDP on health and this has been
more or less stable over the years. This level of spending
is comparable to other countries in the region. However,
only half of this amount is publicly financed and out-of-
pocket payments remain considerably high.
Public health spending in Albania is financed by social
health insurance contributions and general tax revenues.
Health insurance in Albania should cover most of the
formal costs of primary health care and all the costs of
hospital care. Patients are formally required to pay
small, fixed co-payments per visit in outpatient services
or for specialised treatments in hospital care, but until
2005 the amounts required were very low. Payments or
gifts made directly to medical staff are not foreseen in
the financing of health care and episodes of ‘under-the-
table’ payments requested by medical staff are consid-
ered as acts of bribery and punishable by law. However,
a general lack of accountability and good governance
combined with the lack of resources has contributed to
a high incidence of informal payments in the public
health sector [11]. Informal payments account for at
least one quarter of hospital costs in 2005 [17], even
though by law inpatient care is free of charge.
In the literature, informal payments are defined as
direct cash/in-kind unofficial payments to health care
providers and/or private purchases of health services
and other products meant to be covered by the health
system [19,20]. Country specific factors and data avail-
ability have a large influence on the use of this defini-
tion. Most of the previous articles in Albania based on
LSMS (Living Standard Measurement Survey) data have
identified informal payments as ‘gifts paid to medical
staff” [17]. The same definition is also employed in this
article.
1
The informal nature of such payments makes them
unpredictable for individual households that find them-
selves exposed to the financial risks of health care
events. Previous studies have shown that these payments
directly influence the welfare of the household. House-
holds may have to cope by using their savings, selling
assets or borrowing money [1,21].
The informal nature and the dependence on health
status and income rank informal payments among the
most severe burdens imposed on individuals. In the
absence of formal arrangements or a market for insur-
ance against such risks (in Albania informal payments
are also paid by a large share of individuals entitled to
health insurance benefits) the burden is left to
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mostly to support from other household members and
to the coping strategies that the households employ on
such occasions.
Previous research has shown that households facing
catastrophic health care expenditures resort mostly to
intra-household strategies for raising money to pay
rather than to receiving help from extended households’
members [2]. Households may decide to alter labour
supply (i.e. if the household head falls ill other members
m a yd e c i d et ow o r kt os u b s t i t u t ef o rt h el o s so f
incomes), sell property (or livestock in rural areas), or
borrow money from relatives/banks [1,22,23]. The stra-
tegies employed by households may differ depending on
the available resources, severity of the health impair-
ment and treatment needed, the level of the payments
demanded, or the household member in question.
There are various theories on how resources within
the household are allocated over members. It has been
shown that the share of contributed income determines
the share of expenditures on each of the household
members [24-26]. Other studies showed that female-
headed households allocate resources more towards
children, hence contributing to a better health status
and higher enrolment rates [27,28].
We can view informal payments as an investment in
health care. Medical care, together with education and
training are investments in human capital [29]. The
amounts invested in health care depend on the expected
returns from such capital. Such expected returns are
higher if health more critically depends on receiving health
care, if remaining life expectancy is higher, if earnings are
higher, etc. If we accept that informal payments help
patients to obtain better treatment (and thus improve
their health status) then we can assume that households
will be more willing to allocate resources towards indivi-
duals with higher returns on health [30]. In this case,
higher income earners would be favoured to invest upon i.
e. households would be more willing to spend on women
or spouses earning wages or in children as they have a
longer remaining life expectancy than adults.
Households also differ in their decisions to spend on
health care services. This may depend on the number of
household members. Gary Becker [29] links the “quality”
of children (the amount spent on each child) to the
number of children in the household. Households tend
to spend more on each child if the number of children
is lower. This theory will also have direct consequences
for health care expenditures and informal payments. It
implies that households with more children and
extended households will be less willing to pay higher
amounts for health care on each child.
Households in Albania rely on their social network for
getting the support that public policies cannot offer.
Previous studies have demonstrated that family is the
main source for borrowing money [31]. Households also
rely to a greater extent on their social network for
avoiding informal payments or improving the delivery
and the quality of services [32]. Albanian social attitudes
(especially in rural or deprived communities) tend to
favour men. This creates gender inequalities and may
also affect attitudes towards paying for health care. Such
gender inequalities in Albania are reported in employ-
ment, health care, education and social life [13].
Methods
The data used in this article come from the Albanian Liv-
ing Standard Measurement Survey (ALSMS). The data
are publicly available and anonymous.
2 For our analysis
we pool data from 2002 and 2005 surveys. Both samples
in these two cross sectional surveys are country represen-
tative. The households sampled numbered 3600 in 2002
and 3638 in 2005. The questionnaires include informa-
tion on household demography, education, incomes, type
of illness (sudden or chronic) and health care payments.
In addition, information is available on the ways that
households raise money to pay for health services. All the
variables that we have included in our analysis come
from identical questions in these two years.
The informal payments to medical staff include both
in-kind gifts and in-cash payments (all converted to their
monetary value). The number of individuals who have
visited ambulatory services was 3583
3 while the indivi-
duals hospitalised numbered 1384
4 from a total of 31101
individuals in the sample. We have further divided
households in two types: nuclear and extended. The divi-
sion is based on the type of kinship relations between
household members. Nuclear households include only
two generation families. Household members here are
the household head, the spouse and children (single
headed households are also included in this category).
The extended households include more than two genera-
tions, multiple younger couples living together, or cou-
ples living together with more distant relatives.
In order to investigate how individual characteristics
influence informal payments to medical staff we use two
different models for the probability of payments (the
probit model) and amount paid (the Ordinary Least
Squared model). The probability of paying informally
can be considered as dependent on the individual char-
acteristics of patients and other household members.
Hence the probability of paying can be expressed as:
P(y∗
i )=

xiβ + ∈i, if yi > 0
0, if yi =0
. (1)
Where yi refers to the amount paid informally to med-
ical staff, xi denotes a vector characteristics of individual
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vector of estimated coefficients corresponding to such
characteristics, and εi is a vector of residuals errors that
have a normal distribution.
Similarly, the amount paid informally to medical staff
can also be considered as determined by individual char-
acteristics of patients and their households. In such case
the amount is expressed as:
yi = xiβ + ∈i. (2)
This later equation is estimated using OLS. All models
are run separately for nuclear and extended households.
As our interest lies on testing for eventual differences
between coefficients for these two types of households,
we use a generalised Hausman specification test [33].
This post-estimation test allows us to compare coeffi-
cients in the models estimated for nuclear and extended
households. The advantage of such specification test is
that it makes use of the sandwich covariance estimator
to adjust for any heteroskedasticities in the outcomes.
Our models are estimated separately for inpatient and
outpatient care. For comparative purposes, we follow
the same procedure to estimate similar models for the
total amount of out-of-pocket expenditures for health
care.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows that about 26 per cent of the patients in
outpatient care and 59 per cent of those using inpatient
care have paid informally to medical staff. The incidence
of payments varies little over nuclear or extended
households.
However, nuclear households are more likely to pay
informally for their members (both in outpatient and
inpatient care) and at the same time pay higher amounts
for household members in both services. Informal pay-
ments paid per admission in inpatient care are much
higher compared to those paid for outpatient care.
Patients pay approximately 55 times more per visit for
inpatient than for outpatient care. This shows that such
informal payments are in fact implicit payments
imposed by medical staff.
Table 2 gives a detailed overview of the characteristics
of children and spouses by household type. As we can
observe, the education level of spouses in extended
households is much lower than in nuclear households.
Almost 71 per cent of the spouses in extended house-
holds have only primary education (8 or less years of
education) and only 4 per cent of them have university
education. Spouses in extended households are also
older (with an average age of 48.85 years).
Children are also more likely to have primary educa-
tion and health insurance in nuclear households. This
may be due to the fact that children in nuclear house-
holds are on average younger compared to extended
households. Therefore they are more likely to follow
education and be covered by health insurance.
5 These
first descriptive results show clearly that spouses and
children in nuclear households seem to have invested
more in human capital (they have on average more edu-
cation). This may be due to a higher earning potential
(as the data for spouses show).
Households use different methods to cope with unin-
sured health expenditures. Borrowing money is one of
the most frequently used methods among them (see
Table 3) attesting for the mutual help among household
and community members (in the absence of formal
mechanisms). The data show that nuclear households
are more likely to borrow money compared to extended
households. The next two popular methods are selling
agriculture products or animals. These methods are
more popular for extended households which live
mostly in rural areas and rely more on products or ani-
mals as a form of insurance.
Results from Probit and OLS models
Table 4 gives the probit estimation results for the inci-
dence of informal payments in outpatient and inpatient
care as well as the generalised Hausman tests for differ-
ences between coefficients for nuclear and extended
households. Results show that generally households
seem more likely to pay for spouses than for
Table 1 The incidence and amounts paid informally in outpatient and inpatient health care services.
Outpatient Service Inpatient Services
Household Types The incidence of informal
payments
Amount paid
informally
(per visit)
The incidence of informal
payments
Amount paid
informally
(per admission)
Nuclear household 0.27 104.78** 0.60 5203.23
Extended household 0.25 73.74** 0.58 4792.98
Mean for the total
sample
0.26 91.25 0.59 5019.79
Note: Amounts are in Albanian Leks. All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010). All series are deflated with
2002 prices. Stars indicate if the mean for the particular group is significantly different from the mean of all other groups (*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1).
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is statistically significant in extended households for out-
patient care. On the other hand, paying informally for
children is less likely than paying for household heads.
This is especially the case for outpatient care (where
coefficients for both nuclear and extended households
are statistically significant) and to a lesser extent for
inpatient care. This significant effect in outpatient care
may be due to the specifics of illnesses for each house-
hold member as for example women needing more
health care than men [34,35]. The differences in the
probability of paying informally between two types of
households are not statistically significant both for out-
patient and inpatient care, suggesting that patients are
faced with similar probabilities of paying for these ser-
vices. The positive (but not significant) coefficient for
children living in nuclear households and visiting inpati-
ent care may suggest that whenever households face an
increased risk of paying informal payments (descriptive
statistics showed that the probability of paying is very
high in inpatient care) nuclear households may be more
willing to pay for their children.
The number of children in the household lowers the
probability of paying informally to medical staff espe-
cially for outpatient care (statistically significant). The
number of siblings in the household lowers the prob-
ability of paying informally for health care [36] and in
addition children are more likely to be covered by health
insurance. The effect is not as strong for inpatient care
where the influence of health insurance is lower and
informal payments are more spread. The nature of ill-
ness (having a sudden/acute condition) has a positive
effect for both types of households in outpatient care.
The results show that nuclear household patients with
sudden illness have lower probability to pay informally
compared with extended households. The nature of ill-
ness has the opposite effect for the inpatient care for
both types of households.
The variable for the timing of the survey (2002/2005)
shows that the incidence of informal payments has
decreased for outpatient care for both types of house-
holds. However, this is not the case for inpatient care
where informal payments have decreased for nuclear
households but increased for the extended ones. The
significant difference in coefficients, when the general-
i s e dH a u s m a nt e s ti sa p p l i e d ,s h o w st h a tw h e nc o n -
fronted with inpatient care such households are more
likely to pay in 2005 than they were in 2002 and that
this is definitely higher than for nuclear households.
This can be due to the higher needs these households
may have over time (e.g. having older household mem-
bers who need extensive care).
Health insurance decreases the probability of paying
informally both for nuclear and extended households in
inpatient and outpatients care. This is encouraging,
especially for inpatient care where the link between the
contributions and service provision has been weaker. On
the contrary, household income per capita does not have
any significant effects indicating that informal payments
affect patients throughout income distribution.
6
The effect of the methods chosen by the household to
raise money for health care on the incidence of informal
payments does not vary between different types of
households. However, a generalised Hausman test
Table 2 Characteristics of spouses and children in nuclear and extended households
Spouse of the household head Children of the household head
Nuclear Household Extended Household Total Nuclear Household Extended Household Total
Without education 0.00** 0.01** 0.01 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.05
Primary education 0.55*** 0.71*** 0.6 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.67
Secondary education 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.33 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.23
University education 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
Age 43.71*** 48.85*** 45.13 14.49*** 20.50*** 16.13
Has health insurance 0.43* 0.45* 0.43 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.32
Note: Stars indicate whether the mean for each household type is significantly different from the mean of the other type (*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1).
Table 3 Methods to raise money to pay for health care
Nuclear families Extended families Mean of the total sample
Method to raise money -borrow money 0.653*** 0.589*** 0.626
Method to raise money - sell animal 0.176*** 0.245*** 0.205
Method to raise money - sell products 0.125*** 0.181*** 0.149
Method to raise money - sell valuables 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.007
Method to raise money - other methods 0.110** 0.097** 0.104
Note: Stars indicate whether the mean for each household type is significantly different from the mean of the other type (*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1).
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nuclear and extended households for the method to
raise money. The differences show that it is more diffi-
cult for extended households to raise money through
borrowing or selling products or valuables. This indi-
cates that they may use more often other ways for rais-
ing money like for example transfers from other
relatives (even though the survey does not allow us to
control for this).
Age of the patient has a negative effect on the prob-
ability of paying informally, except for extended house-
holds in inpatient care. This confirms our expectations
about investments in health care for aging members of
such households. A higher education of the patient has
a negative effect on informal payments. But, as expected,
the generalised Hausman test shows more differences
between types of households (especially for outpatient
care where effects are statistically significant). Mincer
and Polacheck [30] argue that households invest more
on members who will ensure higher returns in the
future. Households choose to invest in those members
with higher returns to human capital investments and
children’s payback time is longer and returns are higher
[37]. In fact, a higher education of the child in nuclear
households increases the probability of informal pay-
ments to medical staff suggesting that people in such
Table 4 The Incidence of informal payments to medical staff in outpatient and inpatient health care services
Outpatient Service Inpatient Service
Nuclear
household
Extended
household
Difference
(nuclear-
extended)
Nuclear
household
Extended
household
Difference
(nuclear-
extended)
Spouse of the household 0.309 (0.344) 1.150** (0.476) -0.841 0.568 (0.499) 0.449 (0.503) 0.120
Children of the household -0.589** (0.288) -0.329* (0.193) -0.261 0.168 (0.437) -0.402 (0.301) 0.570
(Household head)
Number of children into the
household
-0.036 (0.026) -0.053* (0.032) 0.018 -0.019 (0.036) 0.041 (0.043) -0.060
Sudden illness 0.106 (0.068) 0.198*** (0.076) -0.092 -0.061 (0.112) -0.243* (0.125) 0.182
Year of the survey (year 2002 =
0; year 2005 = 1)
-0.255*** (0.069) -0.222*** (0.081) -0.033 -0.231** (0.101) 0.024 (0.116) -0.255*
Health insurance -0.089 (0.073) -0.267*** (0.082) 0.178 -0.299*** (0.105) -0.270** (0.120) -0.029
ln income per capita -0.006 (0.032) -0.016 (0.036) 0.010 0.029 (0.045) 0.026 (0.046) 0.002
Living in rural area 0.174** (0.075) 0.060 (0.085) 0.115 0.002 (0.109) -0.059 (0.128) 0.061
Method to raise money -
borrowing money
0.106 (0.065) 0.031 (0.076) 0.074 0.026 (0.096) -0.138 (0.108) 0.164
Method to raise money -
animal, products & valuable
0.083 (0.090) 0.124 (0.098) -0.041 0.143 (0.132) -0.024 (0.137) 0.167
(Other method to raise money)
Age of the household head -0.010** (0.005) -0.002 (0.002) -0.008* 0.001 (0.007) 0.006** (0.003) -0.005
Age of the household spouse -0.016*** (0.005) -0.017** (0.007) 0.001 -0.011* (0.006) -0.005 (0.008) -0.006
Age of the household child -0.004 (0.009) 0.011 (0.010) -0.015 -0.003 (0.011) 0.007 (0.012) -0.010
Gender of the household head -0.133 (0.169) 0.142 (0.168) -0.275 0.517* (0.285) -0.619* (0.318) 1.136***
Gender of the household child 0.090 (0.112) 0.268 (0.201) -0.179 0.142 (0.176) 0.497 (0.310) -0.355
Level of education of the hh
head
1
-0.025 (0.036) -0.024 (0.045) -0.001 0.079 (0.058) -0.123 (0.091) 0.203**
Level of education of the hh
spouse
-0.003 (0.041) -0.229** (0.091) 0.227** 0.100 (0.062) -0.041 (0.109) 0.141
Level of education of the hh
child
0.201** (0.084) -0.160 (0.137) 0.360*** 0.079 (0.107) -0.006 (0.149) 0.086
Constant -0.055 (0.393) -0.319 (0.329) 0.263 -0.061 (0.567) 0.057 (0.398) -0.118
Log likelihood -1099.4186 -793.4290 -506.4827 -383.1305
Pseudo R2 0.0396 0.0428 0.0301 0.0318
Number of observations 1992 1504 765 575
1 Level of education is represented as a categorical variable where: (0) “Without education"; (1) “Primary education"; (2) “ Secondary education"; (4) “University
education"; (5) “Postgraduate education”
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors and reference categories are in brackets.
Tomini et al. BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:17
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/17
Page 6 of 12households are willing to invest more in human capital
( t h e r e f o r et h e ya r em o r el i k e l yt op a yf o rt h e i rh i g h e r
educated children). On the other hand, spouses with
higher education in extended households are less likely
to pay informally especially for outpatient care. Having
more education (and probably less resources) translates
to more bargain power with medical staff. On the same
time having higher education gives more chance to
work in the formal market and to have health insurance.
Table 5 gives the OLS estimation results for the
amount paid informally as well as the generalised Haus-
man tests for differences between coefficients for
nuclear and extended households. The amounts paid
informally in outpatient and inpatient care differ
significantly from each other. The amounts paid for
inpatient care are much higher (due to the severity of
the conditions) and households have to prioritise the
allocation of health expenditures based on the particular
position of household members.
Results show that in inpatient care nuclear households
and extended households differ significantly in the
amount paid informally for spouses (as compared to the
household head and children). Nuclear households pay
significantly higher amounts for spouses than extended
households. The differences are also confirmed by the
generalised Hausman test. Extended households are
concentrated mostly in rural areas and the average age
is higher than in nuclear households. This means that
Table 5 The amount of informal payments to medical staff in outpatient and inpatient health care services
Outpatient Service Inpatient Service
Nuclear
household
Extended
household
Difference
(nuclear-
extended)
Nuclear
household
Extended
household
Difference
(nuclear-
extended)
Spouse of the household 0.278 (0.410) 0.362 (0.413) -0.084 1.953*** (0.688) -1.186* (0.711) 3.139***
Children of the household -0.214 (0.359) -0.110 (0.198) -0.104 -0.113 (0.620) -0.460 (0.507) 0.347
(Household head)
Number of children into the
household
-0.066** (0.029) -0.045 (0.028) -0.021 -0.153*** (0.051) -0.188*** (0.061) 0.035
Sudden illness -0.230*** (0.077) -0.051 (0.069) -0.179 -0.090 (0.162) -0.415** (0.200) 0.326
Year of the survey (year 2002 =
0; year 2005 = 1)
0.117 (0.079) -0.005 (0.080) 0.122 0.119 (0.146) -0.058 (0.178) 0.177
Health insurance -0.170** (0.079) -0.226*** (0.076) 0.056 -0.277* (0.153) -0.161 (0.188) -0.116
ln income per capita -0.055 (0.034) -0.001 (0.032) -0.055 -0.014 (0.059) 0.088 (0.066) -0.102
Living in rural area 0.227*** (0.084) -0.005 (0.081) 0.231** -0.129 (0.155) 0.054 (0.195) -0.183
Method to raise money -
borrowing money
-0.112 (0.074) 0.071 (0.071) -0.184* -0.144 (0.136) -0.148 (0.167) 0.004
Method to raise money -
animal, products & valuable
-0.113 (0.094) 0.251*** (0.086) -0.365*** 0.141 (0.182) 0.103 (0.212) 0.038
(Other method to raise money)
Age of the household head -0.007 (0.006) 0.005** (0.002) -0.011** 0.007 (0.010) -0.011*** (0.004) 0.017*
Age of the household spouse -0.008 (0.005) -0.007 (0.007) -0.001 -0.030*** (0.009) 0.001 (0.012) -0.031**
Age of the household child -0.001 (0.010) -0.010 (0.011) 0.008 0.037** (0.019) 0.017 (0.018) 0.020
Gender of the household head -0.312 (0.202) -0.037 (0.158) -0.276 0.427 (0.360) 0.409 (0.566) 0.019
Gender of the household child -0.136 (0.120) 0.213 (0.193) -0.349* 0.097 (0.252) 0.160 (0.496) -0.063
Level of education of the hh
head
1
0.099** (0.045) -0.107** (0.044) 0.205*** 0.132 (0.082) 0.253* (0.144) -0.121
Level of education of the hh
spouse
0.044 (0.047) 0.164* (0.093) -0.120 0.077 (0.081) 0.569*** (0.163) -0.492***
Level of education of the hh
child
0.183** (0.086) 0.269 (0.164) -0.086 0.246 (0.166) 0.203 (0.239) 0.043
Constant 6.371*** (0.461) 5.501*** (0.296) 0.870 5.979*** (0.765) 6.058*** (0.569) -0.079
R2 0.1092 0.1163 0.1170 0.1440
Number of observations 521 361 438 316
1 Level of education is represented as a categorical variable where: (0) “Without education"; (1) “Primary education"; (2) “ Secondary education"; (4) “University
education"; (5) “Postgraduate education”
Notes: All series with 2002 prices. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors and reference categories are in brackets.
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and therefore they allocate fewer resources mostly to
spouses. Even though they seem more likely to pay for
spouses (see the right side of Table 4) they allocate on
average fewer resources to them. Another reason could
be the lower bargaining power that spouses may have in
extended households (they are less educated and less
likely to work).
The number of children is negatively associated with
the amount paid informally in both nuclear and
extended households. The effect is larger for extended
households visiting inpatient care. This is consistent
with what Behrman et al., [36] have found on invest-
ments on education. Households with many children are
constrained to divide resources among a larger number
of household members and therefore children with
more siblings may receive fewer resources for health
care than children with fewer siblings.
The coefficients indicating the years of the survey are
not significant for neither the household types (contrary
to what we observed in models for the incidence of pay-
ing) showing that informal payments have changed in
numbers but not in substance (i.e. the amount paid).
Health insurance appears to be important in lowering
the amounts paid both for inpatient and outpatient care
but the effect for extended households in inpatient care
is lower than for nuclear ones. This may show that such
households may have less bargaining power against
medical staff.
The level of income per capita does not have any sig-
nificant effect on the amount paid by both types of
households. On the other hand, the generalised Haus-
man test indicates that methods to raise money for
health care differ between types of households. When
paying informally extended households are more likely
to borrow or sell products, animals or valuables. This
shows that shocks associated with health care events are
more severe for these types of households. By affecting
their income generating capabilities such events may
have more long-term consequences for these
households.
Age of the patient generally lowers the amount paid
even though this effect may vary between types of
households. For example, the Hausman tests show that
older heads of extended households pay higher amounts
for outpatient care but they pay lower amounts for inpa-
tient care. Such change may be determined by the lower
ability to pay for health care of the extended
households.
Generally, households seem to be willing to pay more
for males than for females and this may be again related
to the theory of human capital (Albania is still a patriar-
chal society where males have more income generating
power than females). Once more, education plays an
important role in determining the amounts paid infor-
mally. Higher educated spouses in extended households
pay significantly more than their counterparts in nuclear
households. This indicates that education gives them
more bargaining power within the household. Similar to
the incidence of payments, nuclear households pay more
for their higher educated children.
Table 6 presents estimates for the amounts paid out-
of-pocket for inpatient and outpatient care. Out-of-
pocket includes all the costs related to service fees, med-
icines, laboratory work, and transportation costs. In
order to see the difference between out-of-pocket
expenditures and informal payments, we have not
included informal payments in the out-of-pocket pay-
ments. We use the same control variables in order to
make results comparable with those on informal pay-
ments. The results confirm the trend for the total
amount paid out-of-pocket in inpatient care for spouses
and children. Households seem to pay more for spouses
than they do for children (compared to the household
head and other members of the households). This may
be due to the better health insurance coverage of the
children (paying less for formal fees or medicines) but
also to the changes in specific health care needs.
The results show that out-of-pocket payments have
decreased throughout the years for outpatient but not
for inpatient care. As we can see from the table, health
insurance turns out to be not significant for the
amounts paid for inpatient care. This is evidence for the
smaller role that such mechanisms have in this service.
The Hausman tests indicate that nuclear households
are again more able to borrow money for health care
than the extended ones when paying informally for out-
patient care (and thus confirming their higher borrow-
ing abilities). However both types of households do not
show a clear pattern when paying for inpatient care
demonstrating that the level of out-of-pocket payments
can be well beyond their immediate strategies for raising
money.
The age of patients has a negative effect on the
amount of out-of-pocket payments for the adults while
the age of children has (mostly) a positive effect. It
appears that households tend to spend more on out-of-
pocket for older children than for the younger ones.
This may also be related to older children’s ability to
generate an income and have a better position within
the household in terms of resource distribution. Con-
trary to what we have found for informal payments,
education of the spouse increases the amount of out-of-
pocket paid for nuclear households. This change may
reflect the complex composition of out-of-pocket pay-
ments (including fees, medicines, laboratory, and trans-
port) showing that higher educated women in nuclear
households spend more resources on higher quality
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Page 8 of 12services (e.g. by buying more expensive drugs or labora-
tory tests).
The nature of informal payments is different from that
of total out-of-pocket payments and this may also con-
tribute to slightly different results. However, the com-
parable findings for most of the variables suggest that
informal payments are well embedded in the health care
system of the country.
Discussion
Our results do not show strong differences between house-
hold types in the probability of paying informally, indicat-
ing that informal payments are widespread and requested,
and imposed on all households. Contrary to that, for the
amounts paid there are differences between households in
the way they allocate resources between their members. If
we consider informal payments as an indicator of invest-
ment in health care, we can say that nuclear households
appear to be more likely to invest in the health care of chil-
dren and spouses. They spend higher amounts on children
and spouses (compared to the other members of the
households) than extended households. Spouses and chil-
dren in such households are also likely to get more educa-
tion and more likely to earn income from employment.
The findings generally support the hypotheses of
health care as a human capital investment and give
Table 6 The amount paid out-of-pocket for outpatient and inpatient health care services (excluding informal
payments)
Outpatient service Inpatient service
Nuclear
household
Extended
household
Difference
(nuclear-
extended)
Nuclear
household
Extended
household
Difference
(nuclear-
extended)
Spouse of the household 0.107 (0.252) 0.236 (0.324) -0.129 -0.143 (0.577) 0.456 (0.580) -0.599
Children of the household -0.697*** (0.208) -0.361*** (0.131) -0.336 -0.100 (0.506) -0.018 (0.341) -0.081
(Household head)
Number of children into the
household
-0.016 (0.019) 0.022 (0.022) -0.038 -0.095** (0.042) -0.020 (0.049) -0.075
Sudden illness -0.129*** (0.049) -0.085 (0.054) -0.044 0.166 (0.133) -0.232 (0.147) 0.397**
Year of the survey (year 2002 =
0; year 2005 = 1)
-0.106** (0.050) -0.024 (0.057) -0.082 0.094 (0.120) 0.096 (0.137) -0.002
Health insurance -0.253*** (0.053) -0.065 (0.058) -0.189*** 0.006 (0.125) 0.072 (0.142) -0.066
ln income per capita 0.011 (0.023) 0.014 (0.026) -0.003 0.046 (0.056) 0.014 (0.056) 0.033
Living in rural area 0.199*** (0.055) 0.233*** (0.060) -0.035 -0.023 (0.129) -0.028 (0.149) 0.005
Method to raise money -
borrowing money
0.206*** (0.047) 0.074 (0.054) 0.132* -0.170 (0.112) -0.081 (0.127) -0.089
Method to raise money -
animal, products & valuable
0.156** (0.067) 0.222*** (0.070) -0.066 0.008 (0.149) -0.133 (0.158) 0.140
(Other method to raise money)
Age of the household head -0.008** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) -0.009** -0.006 (0.008) 0.000 (0.003) -0.007
Age of the household spouse -0.010*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.005) -0.009 -0.002 (0.007) -0.009 (0.009) 0.007
Age of the household child 0.021*** (0.007) 0.022*** (0.007) -0.001 0.020 (0.013) -0.017 (0.014) 0.038**
Gender of the household head 0.034 (0.118) 0.096 (0.119) -0.062 0.030 (0.324) -0.586 (0.357) 0.616
Gender of the household child -0.151* (0.084) -0.053 (0.140) -0.098 0.029 (0.207) -0.569 (0.351) 0.599
Level of education of the hh
head
1
0.048* (0.026) 0.035 (0.032) 0.013 0.148** (0.067) -0.065 (0.101) 0.213
Level of education of the hh
spouse
0.051* (0.029) 0.061 (0.051) -0.010 0.188** (0.074) -0.098 (0.143) 0.286*
Level of education of the hh
child
-0.087 (0.064) 0.012 (0.084) -0.099 0.006 (0.126) 0.416** (0.172) -0.411*
Constant 7.251*** (0.285) 6.428*** (0.240) 0.824 6.033*** (0.673) 6.379*** (0.480) -0.346
Pseudo R2 0.1009 0.0660 0.0455 0.0345
Number of observations 1871 1378 699 529
1 Level of education is represented as a categorical variable where: (0) “Without education"; (1) “Primary education"; (2) “ Secondary education"; (4) “University
education"; (5) “Postgraduate education”.
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors and reference categories are in brackets.
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payments in health care. We consider such informal
payments an uninsured risk (as it is also often not
entirely dependent on health insurance). In such situa-
tions households choose to allocate their resources over
the individuals with the highest earning potential or the
highest bargaining power within the household.
Nuclear and extended households differ in their deci-
sions to allocate resources over their members in invest-
ing in medical care. The main factors relate to the
specific position of the member (whether he/she is the
head, the spouse, or the child) but also on other factors
like age, education and gender. Our results show that
households seem to be more likely to allocate resources
to spouses than to children. As children in Albania are
more likely to be covered by health insurance this may
indicate a better protection against informal payments
for children, and thus, less informal payments for them.
The effect may also reflect the different type of health
care needed for children and spouses. We find no signif-
icant differences between households in choosing to pay
for different households members, but there are more
differences when the amount paid is considered. The
results show that for inpatient care nuclear households
pay significantly higher amounts for spouses demon-
strating that spouses may have better bargaining power
in nuclear households. Descriptive statistics show that
spouses in such households are on average older and
better educated than in the extended households. They
therefore may have higher income generating abilities
and this may influence their bargaining power within
the household. In fact, we show that education of the
spouses influences significantly the amount paid infor-
mally in extended households (when compared to the
nuclear ones).
The quality of human capital investments in children
depends on the resources available, and resources avail-
able depend on the type of households. We show that
both the incidence and the amount paid declines if
households have a higher number of children. The edu-
cation level of children seems to influence the decision
on the amounts allocated for informal payments. House-
holds choose to invest more on members that will
ensure higher returns in the future [30] and children
with higher education are the perfect example of this
investment [37]. Individuals also choose to pay (invest)
more on males knowing that they may generate higher
returns (this is also given the patriarchal Albanian
society).
In general, we find that patients in inpatient care seem
to be more exposed to informal payments to medical
staff. This could be due to limited health insurance for
inpatient care and due to more severe health conditions
treated. Higher payments and less protection from
health insurance expose especially children and spouses
to whom fewer resources are allocated. The positive
effect that health insurance has on decreasing informal
payments in outpatient care is encouraging. However, it
is doubtful whether it may have the same effect in inpa-
tient care where a more complex organisation and more
resources are needed. Experiences from other former-
socialist countries show that compared to tax-based
funding, social health insurance may have a questionable
social benefit [38-40]. This calls for more attention of
policy makers in evaluating the social benefits (e.g.
macro-efficiency and equity in the public health care
sector) of introducing the health insurance in inpatient
care in Albania.
Conclusions
The findings of this study show that in absence of pro-
tection by formal mechanisms individuals with less bar-
gaining power in the household (e.g. household
members with lower education) are likely to get fewer
resources to pay for informal payments to medical staff
for health care. Extended households will tend to pay
for members with more bargaining power and will
invest less in children. Such differences should be taken
into account by public policies which should compen-
sate this by redistribution mechanisms targeting disad-
vantaged groups. Such mechanisms include for example,
cash transfers conditioned on utilisation of health care
by small children and young mothers, and subsidised
health care for particular age groups.
The immediate coping strategies of households (i.e. bor-
rowing money or selling products, animals or valuables)
cannot mitigate the increased risk of large payments for
health care and may also hamper their long-term income
generating capabilities. This calls for more attention
towards policies protecting the vulnerable households
against uninsured risks. The intra-household allocation of
resources for health care to children and spouses is cer-
tainly susceptible to the provision of such formal protec-
tion. The possible crowding-out effects of private transfers
towards public transfers or social health insurance cer-
tainly remains a field for further research in the future.
Also governments should implement effective measures
for dealing with informal patient payments in general.
Endnotes
1 Even though such definition does not fully capture all
the informality in the health sector (e.g. payments for
medicines or other materials that are otherwise provided
free of charge), it clearly distinguishes the part of the
out-of-pocket payments paid directly to medical staff.
As the data show, such payments may be voluntary or
requested but their incidence is high for both inpatient
and outpatient.
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Page 10 of 122 The full data sets and the accompanying documenta-
tion can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/lsms.
3 From this total 2120 individuals have visited ambula-
tory services in 2002 and 1463 in 2005.
4 From this total 707 individuals have been hospita-
lised in 2002 and 677 in 2005.
5 In Albania children 0-7 years old and those follow-
ing education are automatically covered by health
insurance.
6 Results using the total expenditures yield also similar
results (available from the authors) but we have used
household income to reflect better the income
distribution.
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